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Crude oil prices have dramatically increased over the past 
years and are now at a historical maximum in nominal 
terms and very close to it in real terms. It is difficult 
to argue, at least for net oil importers, that higher oil 
prices have a positive impact on welfare. In fact, the 
negative relationship between oil prices and economic 
activity has been well documented in the literature. 
Yet, to the extent that higher oil prices lead to lower oil 
consumption, it would be possible to argue that not all 
the effects of a price increase are negative. Climate change 
concerns have been on the rise in recent years and fossil 
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effort in the department to to understand the causes, consequences and possible solutions to the challenges created by 
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fuel consumption is generally viewed as one of the main 
causes behind it. Thus this paper explores whether higher 
oil prices contribute to lowering oil intensities (that is, oil 
consumption per unit of gross domestic product). The 
findings show that following an increase in oil prices, 
OECD countries tend to reduce oil intensity. However, 
the same result does not hold for Latin America (and 
more generally for middle-income countries) where oil 
intensities appear to be unaffected by oil prices. The 
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 I. Introduction 
 
Crude oil prices have dramatically increased over the past years and are now at a 
historical maximum in nominal terms and very close to it in real terms.
1 For example, in 
1998 oil prices averaged about US$12 per barrel (about US$15 in 2007 dollars); in March 
2008 they crossed the US$110 barrier and futures markets indicate that investors expect 
the price of oil to remain around US$98.6 through 2008.
2 In fact, if oil prices remain at 
the level of the March 2008 one year future during the whole year, the price increase (in 
real terms) during the 2000s would be comparable in magnitude to the one observed 
during the 1970s (figure 1).  
 
It is difficult to argue, at least for net importers, that higher oil prices have a 
positive impact on welfare. In fact, the negative relationship between oil prices and 
economic activity has been well documented in the economics literature following the 
work of Hamilton (1983) who found a significant negative correlation between oil price 
changes and real GDP growth using post-war data for the United States. Similarly, 
Huntington (2005) notes that nine of the last ten U.S. recessions were preceded by 
increases in crude oil prices. There are a number of ways in which higher oil prices can 
negatively affect growth. The most obvious is perhaps through the impact that higher oil 
prices may have on production costs such as transportation, energy, or oil-related inputs 
(i.e. higher oil prices would act as a negative supply shock). In addition, high oil prices 
may negatively affect macroeconomic variables such as the inflation rate and the balance 
of payments position of a net importer and contribute to increasing economic uncertainty, 
which in turn may affect investment decisions and damage future growth.  
 
However, to the extent that higher oil prices reduce oil consumption it may be 
possible to argue that not all the effects of a price increase are negative. Today there is 
little doubt that climate change is occurring.  During the 20
th century global atmospheric 
temperatures have increased by roughly 0.8
oC, a pattern of temperature change somewhat 
unique by historical standards. More worrisome, according to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) a best estimate of 
temperature change over the coming century could range (depending on underlying 
assumptions) between 1.8 and 4
 oC, a change not seen in the past 10,000 years.  
   
In turn, the main forces behind global warming -and more generally climate 
change- are the consumption of fossil fuels and the associated increase in atmospheric 
concentrations of green house gases (GHG), such as carbon dioxide whose concentrations 
have raised from around 280 ppm (parts per million) in 1800 to around 380 ppm today.
3 
Thus a reduction in emissions of GHG (i.e. a reduction in fossil fuel reliance
4) appears as 
a key element of any strategy to address climate change concerns. Not surprisingly then, 
                                                 
1 The maximum was in December 1979 when in 2007 US$ the price of a barrel was close to US$110. 
2 On March 31, 2008, the Brent crude future for December 2008 was 98.58. 
3 The science behind the idea that that increases in carbon dioxide concentrations would lead to increases in 
surface temperatures dates to the work by Fourier and Tyndall in the 19
th century. 
4 Implicitly we are ruling out dramatic technologically improvements that allow burning fossil fuels in a 
clean way, something that at least over the short run seems a reasonable assumption.  
  2there is nowadays an ongoing debate regarding the use of carbon taxes, or market based 
mechanisms such as cap and trade systems, to encourage emissions reduction.  
 
Clearly, the extent to which these measures are successful will depend on how 
consumption of fossil fuels -such as oil- reacts to the higher prices implied by the tax or 
cap and trade systems. And the existing empirical evidence on this front is somewhat 
mixed, at least for non-OECD countries. Gately and Huntington (2001) and Dargay, 
Gately, and Huntington (2007) find that that energy demand in OECD countries responds 
to changes in oil prices but find mixed effects for non-OECD countries. They argue that 
the low response to crude oil prices in most Non-OECD countries may reflect 
government interventions designed to avoid pass-through to final consumers.
5 
 
 This paper enters the debate and explores the impact of oil price fluctuations on 
the intensity of oil consumption (i.e. oil consumption per unit of GDP produced) with a 
particular emphasis in the Latin American region. Note in this regard that our exercise 
differs from Gately and Huntington (2001) and Dargay, Gately, and Huntington (2007) in 
that we are exploring whether economies become more oil-efficient when prices increase 
(that is whether economies can continue to produce the same output levels but using less 
oil) rather than just whether economies demand less oil, which in principle could be the 
result of a decline in economic activity and hence of a decline in welfare.  
 
True, it would be possible to argue that a reduction in oil consumption may not be 
the result of increases in efficiency but rather of a switch in energy sources (for example 
from oil to hydropower). Thus in the paper we also explore whether oil price increases 
are also translated into changes in the intensity of energy at large (i.e. in efficiency 
improvements).  
 
To anticipate some of the results below, we find that the oil intensity of Latin 
American countries (excluding oil exporters) is not affected by higher oil prices. This 
would be in contrast to OECD countries where we find that positive oil price changes 
tend to significantly reduce oil, but similar to other middle income countries (excluding 
oil exporters) where oil intensity and oil prices appear to be unrelated. When we explore 
how oil prices affect energy intensity, similar results appear. Once again the OCED 
countries appear to become more efficient while the Latin American and the middle 
income countries sample do not react. We argue that this result may be due to 
government’s decisions of reducing pass through to final consumers. In many middle 
income countries and in particular in Latin America energy prices are heavily regulated 
and energy price changes tend to be a sensitive topic. Thus while this can protect 
consumers by isolating them from price fluctuations (especially price increases) on the 
other hand it may also fail to send the appropriate signals to consumers.  
 
We also find, in line with some of the existing literature, that there are important 
asymmetries in the way oil price fluctuations affect both oil and energy intensities in the 
OECD. For example, while we find that oil increases (whether above its historical 
                                                 
5 They do find a very high income elasticity for Non-OECD countries, largely explained by the growth 
rates in many developing countries. 
  3maximum or else) lead to higher efficiency levels oil decreases leave efficiency levels 
unaffected (i.e. there are no reversals in efficiency once prices decline).  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we review the trends in 
the evolution of oil intensities, introduce the econometric methodology to measure the 
impact of oil prices on oil intensities, and present the empirical results. In section III we 
explore why Latin American oil intensities do not react to changes in oil prices. Finally, 
section IV closes with some conclusions. 
 
II. Oil prices and oil efficiency 
 
II.1 Oil intensities across countries 
 
Oil intensities (measured as barrels of oil consumed per day over annual GDP), 
have evolved in a very different fashion in different regions of the world. This is evident 
from figure 2 where we present oil intensities
6 for a selected number of countries over the 
period 1971-2004. In panel A, the figure shows countries belonging to the Latin 
American region; in Panel B, to the OECD group and in Panel C, to the non-Latin 
American middle income countries. Inspection of this figure suggests three main 
elements.  
 
First, over the past three and half decades oil intensities have declined only 
moderately in Latin America. In fact, median intensity for Latin America declined from 
1.6 barrels per day per million dollar produced (bdmd) in the early 1970s to 1.3 in the 
early 2000s The only exception would be Panama where intensities declined from 2.8 to 
close to 1.7 bdmd. In the rest of the Latin American countries one can observe a few 
modest declines and some increases. This would be in contrast to what we observe in the 
OECD where oil intensities have declined much more markedly. For example, over the 
period under consideration, the US (which is the biggest oil consumer) reduced its oil 
intensity from about 4.2 bdmd to about 2.1. Similarly in Japan and France: in the case of 
Japan, oil intensities declined from 3.6 bdmd to around 2, whereas in the case of France 
the decline was from about 3.1 to also 2.  The median intensity for the OECD countries in 
this sample declined from 2.9 bdmd in the early 1970s to 1.7 in the early 2000s On the 
other hand, the evolution of intensities in Latin America does not seem very different 
from what we observe in other middle income countries.  
 
Second, even though if the most important gains can be observed in the OECD 
countries, today oil intensities appear very similar in the OECD, in Latin America, and in 
the middle income countries and range between 1.1 and 2.1 bdmd. In fact, countries like 
Brazil or Turkey would have little to show in terms of inter-temporal gains, but since in 
the 1970s they already had very low intensities, today also fare very well on this front. 
 
Third, about two-thirds of the reduction in oil intensity in OECD countries was 
achieved by 1985 (i.e. by the end of the second oil crisis). For example, Japan cut oil 
                                                 
6 Oil data are in thousand barrels per day and comes from OECD website, whereas the GDP series is from 
the PWT6.2 and is in million US dollar. 
  4intensities from 3.6 to 2.2 bdmd by 1985, whereas between 1985 and 2004 the decline 
was much more modest (from 2.2 to about 2 bdmd). Or take, the US where by 1985 
intensities had been cut to 2.7 bdmd. To a large extent that was the result of greater home 
insulation, better gasoline mileage, and streamlined production processes that led to a 
reduction in the use of oil per unit of output. Since then, progress in reducing oil intensity 
has continued but much more slowly and one could think that the reason was the lower 
level of prevailing real oil prices. 
 
II.2 Econometric methodology 
 
The previous discussion already suggests that whereas OECD countries oil 
intensities seem to have reacted to the oil price increased in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
the same cannot be said for Latin American and more generally non-OECD countries. 
Now we move to formally test any potential causal link from oil prices to oil and energy 
intensities using the following simple trivariate panel VAR model:  
 
t i t i t i t i i it P y E t E , 1 , 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 ln ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε β α α α ν + Δ + Δ + Δ + + = Δ − − −    (1) 
 
where E is oil consumption as a share of GDP,  y is GDP and P is the price of oil.  i ν  is a 
country-specific fixed effect, and  is an i.i.d. error term. Our primary focus is the 
estimate of β in equation (1). If prices affect oil/energy intensity, we should find β < 0. 
However, to the extent that prices do not affect changes in energy intensity we would find 
that β = 0. Thus in essence we are testing whether oil price changes Granger cause 
oil/energy changes.  
it ε
 
Clearly, it can be argued that the previous model is too restrictive. In fact, a 
number of studies (Mork, 1989, Mork, Olsen and Mysen, 1994) have argued that the 
relationship between oil prices and a number of economic variables (mainly economic 
activity) is asymmetric (i.e. the economic impact of prices increased and declines is 
different) and this could affect the tests based on (1). In this regard, we also estimate a 
model that allows for asymmetric effects. The idea here would be that higher energy 
prices may lead to improvements on the efficiency front through for example investment 
in more energy-efficient equipment and/or retrofitting of existing capital. Price declines 
on the other hand may lead to more intensive usage of the capital in question (e.g. 
adjusting thermostats to more comfortable levels) but will not lead to a reversal in the 
retrofitting. 
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In (2) the hypotheses of interest are now β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. 
 
The previous model can be pushed forward and allow for more flexibility as in 
Gately and Huntington (2002) or Dargay, Gately, and Huntington (2007) who propose a 
model also based on asymmetry and imperfect price-reversibility. Yet, they allow for the 
possibility that not all price increases are the same and hence not all price increases have 
the same effect. In principle, it would be possible that increases that break a price record 
do not have the same effect as increases within what could be considered a normal range. 
More specifically, Gately and Huntington (2002) propose the following decomposition 
for the price level 
 
ln P= ln P0 + ln Pmax + ln Pcut + ln Prec        (3) 
 
where P0  is the price in the starting year; Pmax  is the cumulative increase in the log of 
maximum historical price; Pcut is cumulative decreases in log of price; and Prec  is the 
cumulative sub-maximum increases in log of price. Figure 3 presents a graphical 
decomposition of the (logged) oil prices into the three sub components just defined.  It 
shows that: during the 1970s Pmax and P go hand in hand (i.e. each observation for the 
price of oil was a maximum); during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, most of the 
variation in P is due to Pcut (i.e. price declines dominate the evolution of P); and finally, 
during the last 10 years it is Prec the component that dominates (i.e. prices on the rise but 
without reaching the maximum level). 
 
Using (3) to substitute for the price of oil in (1), then we obtain the following 
unrestricted version for the changes in oil efficiency: 
 
t i t rec t cut t
t i t i i it
P P P
y E t E
, 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 max, 1
1 , 3 1 , 2 1
ln ln ln
) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
ε β β β
α α α ν
+ Δ + Δ + Δ +
+ Δ + Δ + + = Δ
− − −
− −        (4) 
 
In (4) the hypotheses of interest are now β1 < 0, β2 < 0, and β3 < 0. Note that the 
idea in this specification is that price increases may now have different effects depending 
on past prices (i.e. a price increase above the historical maximum is different to a price 
increase in a period of more or less normal variations). In the case of oil demand, Gately 
and Huntington (2002) expected (and found) that β1> β2> β3. Here our prior would be 
similar. 
 
II.3. Results  
 
We now review the results of estimating equations (1), (2) and (4) for a sample of 
108 countries in the world, high income OECD countries, middle income countries and 
LAC. Oil data and the GDP series are as above whereas energy use (in kt of oil 
  6equivalent) is from the World Development Indicators database. Crude oil (Brent) prices 
(in US dollars per barrel) are from British Petroleum.  
 
Inspection of table 1, which reports the results for the less flexible model, 
indicates that the only sample where oil prices appear to Granger cause oil intensities is 
the OECD. In Latin America, other middle income countries, and the world as a whole 
the parameter of the variable capturing changes in oil prices does not come close to being 
significant (i.e. we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality).  
 
Clearly, one could argue that these results are driven by the particular 
specification used. Yet, when we inspect table 2, which is based on model (2), the results 
are in line with those in table 1 except for the sample including all the countries (which 
admittedly could be driven by the OECD sample), although with a qualification. In fact, 
it seems that there are important asymmetric effects associated to price increases and 
price declines. In fact, price declines seem to have no effect on oil intensities.  
 
Table 3 goes one step beyond and present the results of our more general model. 
It suggests that price increases above the maximum historical price have a significant and 
negative impact only in the world and OECD countries. In the latter case, the cumulative 
sub-maximum price recoveries also have a negative and significant effect on oil intensity. 
However, when we test the equality of both coefficients, i.e. β1= β3, we find that they are 
not statistically different. This may suggest that even though oil demand (as measured by 
oil consumption per capita) responds differently to price recoveries (Gately and 
Huntington, 2001;  Dargay, Gately, and Huntington, 2007) than to price beyond historical 
maximum, the oil intensity is equally affected by both types of price increases. On the 
contrary, when we look at price decreases we cannot reject the null of no causality.   
  
Are these results, at least those for the OECD, driven by overall energy efficiency 
gains or instead by a switch in energy sources? To address this question we now re 
estimate the previous models but using overall energy intensity (rather than oil intensity) 
as our variable of interest. The results for these models are in tables 4 to 6.  They indicate 
that while in principle it is may be possible that in OECD countries there is a switch 
between energy sources, it is also the case that when oil prices increase, OECD countries 
experience a gain in overall energy efficiency levels.  
 
IV. Why is it that in Latin American countries intensities do not react to prices? 
 
What can be the reason that makes the Latin American countries behave in a 
different way than the OECD countries and in a similar way to the middle income 
counties? Although the analysis in the preceding section cannot be used to give an answer 
to this question, one can put forward some hypotheses. For example, to the extent that oil 
price changes are not passed through to consumers and instead are covered by, for 
example, public subsidies it could be argued that oil prices may not dramatically affect 
consumption or efficiency levels, as individuals may not have the right incentives to save 
on energy.  
 
  7In this regard, the existing evidence for Latin America suggests that, in general, 
oil exporter countries allow limited pass-through from oil price to gasoline prices, 
whereas oil importer countries tend to allow higher levels of pass-through to final 
consumers. Table 7 summarizes the results of two studies that have explored the degree 
of (international oil prices/domestic gas prices) pass-through over past 10 years in a 
selected number of countries in the region.  
 
For example, Bacon and Kojima (2006) compute the ratio between the change in 
domestic prices (gasoline, diesel) and the change in oil prices -both measured in dollars- 
over 2004-2006 for 8 Latin American countries. They find that Venezuela, Argentina, 
and Mexico have negligible pass-through; Bolivia and Honduras would have pass-
throughs of around 60 percent for gasoline and 80 percent for diesel; finally, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Chile have the highest pass-through of their sample with coefficients 
ranging from .95 to 1.15.  
 
These findings are to a large extent consistent with those in World Bank (2006). 
In this case, the degree of pass-through is estimated as the coefficient from a regression 
of the overall price index of gasoline prices on energy prices. World Bank (2006) 
concludes that in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela there is no pass through. This would 
also be the case in Ecuador. On the contrary in Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, and Guyana the pass through would be complete.  
 
Artana et al. (2007) adopt a different approach and estimate the level of 
“cushioning” of gasoline prices in Central America (net-oil importer countries) as the tax-
wedge in end-user prices. A negative tax-wedge means that governments are cushioning 
consumer prices, reducing the impact that oil prices have on final prices. They find a 
strong cushioning in Costa Rica and Guatemala (diesel), a neutral cushioning in El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama –where neutral means that the tax-wedge for gasoline is 
smaller than the value-added tax, and a weak cushioning in Guatemala (gasoline) and 
Honduras (table 8). 
 
On the whole, the picture that emerges from these studies is somewhat mixed, 
with some countries passing oil price fluctuations (at least to some extent) to final 
consumers (typically net importers) and some others showing a clear disconnect between 
domestic and international price changes (typically net exporters).  
  
Does this conclusion still hold today where crude oil prices are reaching record 
levels? To address this question we have collected data for 13 countries covering the 
period January 2005 to December 2007 in most cases, and longer periods for Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
7 Table 9 provides the average price of three 
derivatives: premium gasoline, regular gasoline, and diesel in each country, measured in 
dollars per gallon.
8 Net oil exporter countries appear with lower prices than net oil 
                                                 
7 We also estimated all the models for the 2005-2007 balanced panel, and for the individual countries with 
longer series. The results remained unchanged. 
8 The octane varies by country. Nonetheless, we classify as premium and regular gasoline following 
international standards. 
  8importers. For example, the gallon of regular gasoline was less than a dollar in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico, while it averaged 1.15 US$/gallon in net oil importers. 
Table 10 provides the simple correlation between changes in oil prices and changes in the 
prices of the three derivatives. Inspection of this table indicates that oil price changes are 
positively and significantly correlated with premium and regular gasoline in net oil 
importer countries even though the correlation is very modest: .22 for premium and .14 
for regular. On the contrary, oil prices do not appear to be correlated with diesel at the 
pump regardless of net importer/net exporter status or with gasoline in net exporters.  
 




t i t i t i t i i it PO PO PG PG , 1 , , 3 1 , 2 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ε β α α ν + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − −    (5) 
 
where PG is our variable of interest (either end-user price of premium, regular, or diesel 
fuels) in dollars,  and PO is the price of oil.  i ν  is a country-specific effect, and  is an 
i.i.d. error term  
it ε
 
Tables 11 and 12 report average results based on pooling the previous data for 
exporters (table 11) and importers (table 12) countries. In both cases, the estimated model 
allows for fix-effects. These tables continue to indicate that in net exporters there is no 
pass-through whereas in importers there is a limited pass through: on average a 1 percent 
increase in crude oil would translate into an average domestic gas increase of between .5 
and .65 depending of the type of fuel considered and model used to estimate the pass 
through.  
 
Finally, we estimate equation (5) using ordinary least squared methods with 
robust standard errors for each individual country. Table 14 reports the econometric 
results. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, in Table 13 we classify countries into 
four groups: (i) no pass-through, if neither the change in current oil price nor the change 
in the price the month before is significant (or significant but negatively related); (ii) low 
pass-through if the coefficients α2 and/or β are positive and significant, with a value 
below 0.33; (iii) medium pass-though if the coefficients α2 and/or β are positive and 
significant, with values between 0.33 and 0.66;  and (iv) high pass-though if the 
coefficients α2 and/or β are positive and significant, with values above 0.66.  
 
Reinforcing the findings from the panel analysis, the four net oil exporters in our 
sample are classified in the “no pass-through category” for all types of fuels. In addition, 
Peru does not show signs of pass-though for regular gasoline (the only type available in 
our sample). Paraguay also appears with no pass-though in the case of regular gasoline, 
but it shows signs of low pass-through for premium gasoline and diesel (15 percent and 
23.7 percent, respectively). Costa Rica is the only Central American country with no 
pass-through in two types of derivatives (premium and diesel), while it translates oil price 
changes to regular gasoline (44 percent). The rest of Central American countries and 
                                                 
9 This model is similar to the one used by World Bank (2006). 
  9Uruguay show evidence of medium or high pass-throughs. In particular, our estimations 
suggest that Nicaragua and Uruguay have high pass-through on premium and regular 
gasoline prices and medium pass-though on diesel prices. El Salvador also shows 
evidence of high pass-through for regular gasoline. Guatemala and Honduras are 





In this paper we have explored the relationship between oil price changes and the 
changes in oil and energy use intensity. Consistent with the literature on oil demand in 
developed countries, we find that OECD oil intensity responds asymmetrically to price 
increases and decreases, although there are no significant differences between price 
beyond historical maximum and price recoveries. However, the same is not true for 
developing countries. In fact, in Latin American and in middle income countries oil 
intensities do not appear to respond to price changes at all.  
 
The paper then has explored whether behind the lack of a causal relationship from 
oil prices to oil and energy efficiency there is a limited pass through from oil prices to 
retail price at the pump. Our estimates suggest that indeed in most Latin American 
countries the pass-through is not complete and hence that oil price increases may not be 
creating the appropriate incentives in the region. 
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Table 2. Oil intensity and prices: an asymmetric relationship? 
LAC Hi-OECD MIC World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive D ln(Oil Price) (t-1) -0.249 -0.0791 -0.0040 -0.095
[2.46e-01] [2.63e-02]** [2.54e-02] [4.44e-02]*
Negative D ln(Oil Price) (t-1) 0.016 0.004 -0.049 0.062
[1.33e-01] [3.31e-02] [4.51e-02] [4.51e-02]
D ln(GDP) (t-1) 0.0299 -0.212 0.033 -0.161
[4.07e-01] [2.41e-01] [2.07e-01] [1.75e-01]
D Oil consump/GDP (t-1) 0.093 0.033 -0.111 -0.113
[0.158] [0.052] [0.063] [0.079]
Time trend 0.0079 0.0022 -0.0009 0.0025
[2.08e-03]** [5.91e-04]** [6.88e-04] [8.07e-04]**
Constant -0.193 -0.070 -0.008 -0.059
[5.57e-02]** [1.59e-02]** [2.27e-02] [1.98e-02]**
Observations 498 704 1263 3505
Number of group(countrycode) 16 22 51 129
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02
Dependent variable: D Oil consumption / GDP
 








  12Table 3. Oil intensity and prices: maximum versus recovery price changes 
LAC Hi-OECD MIC World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D Maximum historical ln(oil price) (t-1) -0.290 -0.073 0.015 -0.114
[3.12e-01] [2.84e-02]** [2.38e-02] [5.60e-02]*
D Cumulative cuts ln(oil price) (t-1) -0.036 0.029 -0.020 0.037
[1.17e-01] [3.47e-02] [4.64e-02] [4.55e-02]
D Cumulative sub-maximum recoveries ln(oil price) (t-1) -0.018 -0.132 -0.089 0.005
[2.52e-01] [3.84e-02]** [4.79e-02] [5.57e-02]
D ln(GDP) (t-1) 0.030 -0.145 0.041 -0.163
[4.12e-01] [2.45e-01] [2.07e-01] [1.74e-01]
D Oil consump/GDP (t-1) 0.096 0.037 -0.110 -0.112
[0.158] [0.052] [0.063] [0.079]
Time trend 0.0063 0.0023 -0.0004 0.0019
[2.93e-03]* [6.12e-04]** [7.42e-04] [9.08e-04]*
Constant -0.179 -0.066 -0.008 -0.054
[5.82e-02]** [1.61e-02]** [2.29e-02] [2.03e-02]**
Observations 498 704 1263 3505
Number of group(countrycode) 16 22 51 129
R-squared 0.05 0.1 0.02 0.02
Dependent variable: D Oil consumption / GDP
 




Table 4. Energy use intensity and prices: the symmetric hypothesis 
LAC Hi-OECD MIC World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D ln(Oil Price) (t-1) -0.016 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
[1.50e-02] [1.41e-03]** [1.49e-03] [2.90e-03]
D ln(GDP) (t-1) 0.022 -0.031 -0.003 -0.015
[3.89e-02] [1.71e-02] [2.04e-02] [2.79e-02]
D Energy use/GDP (t-1) 0.034 -0.123 -0.040 -0.091
[0.218] [0.062]* [0.064] [0.101]
Time trend 0.00042 0.00002 -0.00004 0.00008
[2.09e-04]* [4.11e-05] [4.68e-05] [6.57e-05]
Constant -0.013 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
[5.78e-03]* [1.02e-03] [1.54e-03] [1.81e-03]
Observations 498 704 1082 3201
Number of group(countrycode) 16 22 38 108
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01
Dependent variable: D Energy use / GDP
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Table 5. Energy use intensity and prices: an asymmetric relationship? 
LAC Hi-OECD MIC World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive D ln(Oil Price) (t-1) -0.026 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006
[2.48e-02] [2.19e-03]** [2.14e-03] [4.57e-03]
Negative D ln(Oil Price) (t-1) 0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.001
[1.05e-02] [2.56e-03] [3.20e-03] [4.15e-03]
D ln(GDP) (t-1) 0.018 -0.030 -0.003 -0.015
[3.66e-02] [1.71e-02] [2.04e-02] [2.79e-02]
D Energy use/GDP (t-1) 0.035 -0.129 -0.040 -0.092
[0.218] [0.063]* [0.064] [0.101]
Time trend 0.00042 0.00002 -0.00004 0.00008
[2.07e-04]* [4.11e-05] [4.70e-05] [6.54e-05]
Constant -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
[5.46e-03] [1.11e-03] [1.67e-03] [1.82e-03]
Observations 498 704 1082 3201
Number of group(countrycode) 16 22 38 108
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01
Dependent variable: D Energy use / GDP
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 6. Energy use intensity and prices: maxim versus recovery price changes 
LAC Hi-OECD MIC World
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D Maximum historical ln(oil price) (t-1) -0.037 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009
[3.16e-02] [2.64e-03]** [2.14e-03] [5.74e-03]
D Cumulative cuts ln(oil price) (t-1) -0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
[8.54e-03] [2.50e-03] [3.36e-03] [4.14e-03]
D Cumulative sub-maximum recoveries ln(oil price) (t-1) 0.023 -0.004 -0.002 0.009
[2.18e-02] [2.82e-03] [4.10e-03] [5.12e-03]*
D ln(GDP) (t-1) 0.018 -0.029 -0.003 -0.016
[3.67e-02] [1.74e-02] [2.04e-02] [2.78e-02]
D Energy use/GDP (t-1) 0.036 -0.125 -0.039 -0.092
[0.217] [0.063]* [0.063] [0.101]
Time trend 0.00013 -0.00001 -0.00005 -0.00001
[2.57e-04] [4.45e-05] [5.17e-05] [7.29e-05]
Constant -0.008 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
[5.62e-03] [1.12e-03] [1.66e-03] [1.83e-03]
Observations 498 704 1082 3201
Number of group(countrycode) 16 22 38 108
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01
Dependent variable: D Energy use / GDP
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 

























Honduras 0.60 Complete 0.87
Mexico 0.15 None 0.11
Nicaragua 0.95 0.88
Venezuela 0.00 None 0.00
GASOLINE
 
Sources: bacon and Kojima (2006), The World Bank (2006) 
 
 
Table 8: "Cushioning" of gasoline prices through tax-wedges 
GASOLINE DIESEL GASOLINE DIESEL
Costa Rica Strong Strong Honduras Weak Weak
El Salvador Neutral Neutral Nicaragua Neutral Neutral
Guatemala Weak Strong Panama Neutral Neutral  
Note: The authors classify countries with strong, neutral or weak “cushioning” based on 
the reduction on the tax-wedge. 
Source: Artana et al (2007) 
 
 






Argentina 0.86 0.76 0.60 73
Bolivia 0.90 0.55 0.52 111
Colombia na 0.54 na 108
Costa Rica 1.25 1.20 0.88 29
El Salvador 1.14 1.08 0.95 29
Guatemala 1.14 1.12 0.91 29
Honduras 1.24 1.17 1.02 29
Mexico 0.86 0.73 0.54 120
Nicaragua 1.19 1.14 1.02 29
Panama 2.32 na na 36
Paraguay 1.19 1.07 0.99 36
Peru na 0.90 na 120
Uruguay 1.59 1.55 1.27 20  
Sources: Argentina: Secretaría de Energía de la Nación. Bolivia: 
Gathered by World Bank staff. Colombia: Sistema de Información de 
Petróleo y Gas Colombiano, UPME. Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: SIECA. México: Petróleos 
Mexicanos. Indicadores Petroleros. Panamá: Contraloría General de la 
República, Dirección de Estadística y Censo. Perú: Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística e Informática. Paraguay: Ministry of Finance (diesel), 
and Central Bank of Paraguay (gasoline). Uruguay: ANCAP - 
Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol y Pórtland. 
Expressed in US dollars using the Exchange rate from WDI. 
 
 
Table 10: Pair-wise correlation between oil and gasoline  
price changes, in US$ 
Gasoline










Diesel 0.001 0.987  
Note: net oil-importers: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay 
Net oil-exporters: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, México. 
Source: Own calculations 
  16Table 11: Pass-though in net oil exporter countries 
Dep. Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.354 0.353 0.354 0.464 0.462 0.463 0.340 0.340 0.340
[0.151]* [0.151]* [0.152]* [0.116]** [0.116]** [0.117]** [0.182] [0.182] [0.182]
D (oil price) (t) -0.035 -0.035 -0.063 -0.062 -0.005 -0.004
[0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.033] [0.033]
D (oil price) (t-1) -0.011 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.024 -0.024
[0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030]
Constant 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]* [0.001] [0.001]* [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 295 295 295 401 401 401 295 295 295
C o u n t r i e s 333444333
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 1 60 . 1 60 . 1 60 . 2 90 . 2 80 . 2 90 . 1 60 . 1 60 . 1 6
Premium gasoline Regular gasoline Diesel
 
Net oil-exporters: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, México. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table 12: Pass-though in net oil importer countries 
Dep. Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.147 0.023 0.036 0.159 0.107 0.109 -0.059 -0.079 -0.078
[0.085] [0.087] [0.088] [0.065]* [0.060] [0.060] [0.073] [0.069] [0.069]
D (oil price) (t) 0.190 0.153 0.098 0.061 0.041 0.010
[0.062]** [0.054]** [0.056] [0.047] [0.050] [0.044]
D (oil price) (t-1) 0.493 0.481 0.470 0.465 0.412 0.411
[0.064]** [0.061]** [0.055]** [0.053]** [0.046]** [0.047]**
Constant 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.009 0.009
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]* [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Observations 200 200 200 284 284 284 166 166 166
C o u n t r i e s 888888777
R-squared 0.06 0.3 0.32 0.04 0.31 0.31 0.01 0.36 0.36
Premium gasoline Regular gasoline Diesel
 
Note: net oil-importers: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, 
Uruguay. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table 13: A taxonomy of pass-though by country 
Level of Passthrough Premium Regular Diesel
None (*) Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru
Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico
Low (<.33) Paraguay Paraguay
Medium (.33-.66) El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panama
Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras
El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Uruguay
High (>.66) Nicaragua, Uruguay El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Uruguay
 
(*) None means that either the coefficients for oil price changes were not significant or they were significant 
but negatively related to the gasoline price change. See next table for the regression results. 
Source: authors’ calculations 
  17Table 14: Pass-though by country 
ARG BOL COL CRI SLV GTM HND
Premium
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.593 -0.007 0.135 0.198 0.383 -0.219
[0.169]** [0.041] [0.176] [0.167] [0.110]** [0.138]
D (oil price) (t) -0.069 -0.244 -0.04 0.063 -0.022 0.257
[0.274] [0.261] [0.151] [0.129] [0.111] [0.165]
D (oil price) (t-1) 0.15 -0.041 0.399 0.611 0.595 0.49
[0.204] [0.117] [0.195] [0.115]** [0.105]** [0.101]**
Regular
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.616 0.145 0.338 0.077 0.169 0.384 -0.186
[0.150]** [0.121] [0.090]** [0.168] [0.176] [0.111]** [0.154]
D (oil price) (t) 0.054 -0.041 -0.644 -0.035 0.037 -0.02 0.207
[0.267] [0.058] [0.154]** [0.149] [0.146] [0.114] [0.106]
D (oil price) (t-1) 0.158 -0.149 -0.125 0.44 0.662 0.597 0.508
[0.182] [0.063]* [0.171] [0.204]* [0.122]** [0.106]** [0.089]**
Diesel
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.534 -0.187 -0.091 0.198 0.302 -0.368
[0.205]* [0.123] [0.148] [0.140] [0.099]** [0.215]
D (oil price) (t) 0.223 -0.124 -0.125 -0.064 -0.146 0.231
[0.314] [0.168] [0.115] [0.065] [0.121] [0.117]
D (oil price) (t-1) -0.2 0.023 0.307 0.508 0.567 0.419
[0.251] [0.072] [0.174] [0.085]** [0.069]** [0.103]**
Observations 71 106 106 27 27 27 27
MEX NIC PAN PRY PER URY
Premium
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.127 -0.299 0.134 0.08 -0.194
[0.076] [0.273] [0.240] [0.144] [0.086]
D (oil price) (t) -0.025 0.327 0.474 0.054 -0.01
[0.033] [0.219] [0.143]** [0.044] [0.051]
D (oil price) (t-1) -0.021 0.916 0.416 0.15 0.717
[0.031] [0.263]** [0.217] [0.062]* [0.075]**
Regular
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.100 -0.253 0.136 0.367 -0.206
[0.080] [0.193] [0.126] [0.087]** [0.034]**
D (oil price) (t) -0.042 0.232 0.086 -0.188 -0.022
[0.036] [0.175] [0.054] [0.128] [0.027]
D (oil price) (t-1) -0.02 0.797 0.133 0.102 0.758
[0.029] [0.185]** [0.071] [0.119] [0.037]**
Diesel
D(dep. var.) (t-1) 0.145 -0.323 -0.093 -0.161
[0.116] [0.173] [0.117] [0.120]
D (oil price) (t) -0.011 0.125 0.031 0.143
[0.034] [0.155] [0.073] [0.094]
D (oil price) (t-1) -0.029 0.611 0.237 0.489
[0.031] [0.108]** [0.108]* [0.084]*
Observations 118 27 34 35 118 10  
Notes: All variables are in logs. All models included a constant term. Robust standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: authors’ calculations 






















































































Note: Crude oil prices in US dollars per barrel; Brent, money of $ 2006.  
2008 value is one year future (as of March 31, 2008) 




  19Figure 2. Oil Intensity  
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Source: authors’ calculations




























































































Source: authors’ calculations 
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